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ABSTRACT
“Ending too big to fail” is a declared policy aim and a key element of the globally
coordinated financial regulatory reform. An official list of banks considered to be global
systemically important (G-SIBs) is published on an annual basis since 2011. The goal
of the present paper is to assess to what extent equity and CDS markets care about the
official releases of the G-SIB lists and, in particular, whether the inclusion of a bank in
the G-SIB list is good or bad news for bank debt and equity holders. The analysis applies
both event-studies and panel regressions and relies upon European banks’ CDS senior and
subordinated quotes and equity prices to evaluate their reactions to the publications of the
G-SIB lists. The analysis spans from the first leaked G-SIB list by the Financial Times as
of 2009 to the 2017 official publication of the list.
Results show that equity and senior/subordinated CDS spreads react differently to the
events considered and that reactions evolve over time. During the first events considered
in the analysis, CDS of banks classified as G-SIBs react less than those of other banks.
Results for more recent events are more mixed, potentially reflecting that recent releases
of G-SIBs lists entail less information. The analysis also devotes special attention to a
subset of “intermediate” banks that in principle are eligible to enter in the G-SIBs list, as
compared to other banks that will obviously be included/excluded in the list given their
size and footprint. This narrowed focus allows us to obtain more efficient results.
∗M. Bellia and S. Maccaferri are with the European Commission, Joint Research Centre
(JRC); W. Heynderickx is with the Single Resolution Board but he worked on the paper
when he was with the JRC; S. Schich is with the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD). The present report is part of a collaboration between the EC
JRC and the OECD on the broader topic of the effects of policy reforms and actions on
the value of implicit bank debt guarantees. We thank Fany Nan, Marco Petracco Giudici,
Michela Rancan, Alessandro Rossi (European Commission, Joint Research Centre), Stan
Maes (European Commission DG FISMA), seminar participants at the Joint Research
Centre, IRMC and IFABS conferences for helpful comments. Disclaimer: the opinions
expressed are those of the authors only and should not be considered as representative
of the European institutions or OECD official position. Possible errors and omissions are
those of the authors.
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1 Introduction
During the recent global financial crisis, many large banking groups received
liquidity support or were bailed out by central banks or national governments
based on the view that they were too big or too complex to fail. This choice
was mainly driven by the fact that restoring the confidence of the financial
system and protecting depositors and households was of utmost importance
for the stability of the whole economy. Subsequently, more attention was
paid to the adverse effects of choices to use taxpayers’ money in this way,
not least as it tended to increase moral hazard. Regulators therefore imple-
mented a number of policies, also with the goal of reducing or eliminating
this “too big to fail” (TBTF) expectation. Among other measures, regula-
tors increased the capital requirements and introduced stricter supervision
and resolution planning (see e.g. Heynderickx et al. (2016), Benczur et al.
(2017) and appendix A of Schich (2018) for overviews of policy initiatives).
In this context, in 2011 the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
(BCBS) and the Financial Stability Board (FSB) developed a methodology
to identify Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs). According to
the definition adopted1, G-SIBs are “financial institutions whose distress or
disorderly failure, because of their size, complexity and systemic intercon-
nectedness, would cause significant disruption to the wider financial system
and economic activity”. The FSB publishes the list of G-SIBs on a yearly
basis. Higher capital charges are now imposed on these banks, and they
are subjected to more intrusive regulatory, supervisory and failure resolution
regimes than their peers. These measures are meant to incentivise G-SIBs
to reduce their systemic importance so as not to be TBTF. At the same
time, there is a risk that this approach further entrenches the view that the
thus identified banks are TBTF and that their debt benefits from implicit
government guarantees.
The present paper assesses to what extent the inclusion of banks in the
list of G-SIBs can be regarded as good or bad news for equity and debt
holders. It analyses the reactions of prices of credit default swaps (CDS) for
subordinated and senior bank debt and those of bank stocks to announce-
ments regarding “G-SIB status” (as defined by inclusion of a bank in the
list). CDS prices are particularly relevant, since they capture credit risk
1See https://www.fsb.org/work-of-the-fsb/policy-development/
addressing-sifis/
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information that is specific and cannot be inferred from the prices of other
financial instruments such as equity or bonds (see e.g. Lee et al. (2018)). The
methods used are event-studies and panel regressions and they consider the
reactions of banks’ CDS senior and subordinated quotes and equity prices to
the (annual) publication of the FSB G-SIBs list from 2011 to 2017, the pub-
lication of the draft methodology in 2011 and the publication of supposedly
leaked unofficial lists in 2009 and 2010 by the Financial Times.
Some related studies exist. For example, Afonso et al. (2014) and Kroszner
(2016) provide overviews of studies investigating funding cost differences be-
tween large and small banks, suggesting that the former benefit from implicit
guarantees. In doing so, they consider various instruments, including CDS
spreads, stock returns, deposit costs, ratings, balance sheet data and pre-
miums on M&As. King (2009) studies the reactions of equity prices and
senior debt CDS spreads to the announcements of banks’ rescue packages
in the EU and in the US between October 2008 and January 2009. Follow-
ing Ait-Sahalia et al. (2012), Fiordelisi et al. (2014) compile a detailed list
of monetary policy interventions’ announcements in the Euro area, the US,
Japan, the UK and Switzerland to evaluate the effects of these interventions
on conditions in the interbank market, stock market, and banking sector.
Horvath and Huizinga (2015) focus on a single event, the creation of the
European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) in 2010 and its enlargement in
2011, and investigate its impact on banks’ shares, banks and sovereign CDS.
Mink and De Haan (2013) focus on the news on the 2010 Greek sovereign debt
crisis and its potential bailout and assess the effects on bank stock prices for
48 European banks. Zhao (2018) explicitly considers different CDS contracts
written on senior and unsecured bank debt and evaluates their reactions be-
fore and after the Basel III announcements.
Focusing on G-SIBs versus other banks, Bongini et al. (2015) use an
event study method and identify differences in the stock market reactions
of G-SIBs versus other banks following announcements related to the list of
banks identified as G-SIBs. Their analyses are based on a sample of the 70
world’s largest banks. The authors conclude that, in reaction to the July 2011
identification methodology release, European banks experienced abnormal
positive returns, suggesting that it confirmed expectations that European
authorities might be more willing to support banks if needed. Both G-SIBs
and other sample banks benefitted. Moenninghoff et al. (2015) estimate
the stock prices reactions for a sample of 300 large international banks and
consider a larger set of events, covering both regulatory announcements and
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those related to G-SIBs designations (most of the events were G20 summits).
The authors identify negative bank stock price reactions subsequent to many
of the events, while the announcement of the official list of G-SIBs had an
offsetting positive effect. Thus, the authors conclusion is consistent with a
strengthened perception of the existence of implicit bank debt guarantees.
Scha¨fer et al. (2016b) analyse the effects of four major country-level reg-
ulatory events in Europe and in the US on the stock returns and the CDS
spreads of European and US banks. Results demonstrate that all the reforms
seemed to have lowered bailout expectations. The effects were particularly
distinct for the US banks, as a response to the Dodd-Frank Act and the
Volker rule. The regulatory announcements also show some spillover effects
across countries. A similar paper by the same authors, Scha¨fer et al. (2016a),
analyses the reactions of CDS spreads and stock returns in response to five
bail-in cases that occurred between 2011 and 2014 as well as to the implemen-
tation of the European Single Resolution Mechanism. The authors conclude
that the occurrence of bail-in, especially after the Cyprian case, is reflected
in a subsequent increase in CDS spreads, signalling a reduction in bailout
expectations. These various studies are related to the present analysis; a
more structured review of the literature on implicit bank debt guarantees is
available in Schich (2018).
A different perspective is adopted in the paper by Violon et al. (2017):
they assess if and how G-SIBs designations have an impact on banks’ busi-
ness models and overall activities. To achieve this objective, they apply a
difference-in-difference approach. In another application of such an approach,
Schich and Toader (2017) find that there is no evidence that banks consid-
ered G-SIBs, as compared to other banks, have experienced a larger decline
in credit rating uplifts due to assumed government support.
We contribute to this stream of literature by focusing specifically on iso-
lating the effect of the G-SIB designation announcements in an extended
set of relevant events compared to the previous works, accounting also for
G-SIBs announcements from 2012 to 2017. Moreover, we develop an ad-hoc
analysis focused on a subset of “intermediate” banks that in principle are
eligible to enter in the G-SIBs list. We focus on this subsample since we be-
lieve that there is more information on banks that are close to the eligibility
of being G-SIB, rather than study banks that will obviously be included in
the list given their size and footprint. Results demonstrate that, during the
first events, CDS of banks classified as G-SIB react less than the other banks,
thus pointing to a potential different treatment from the markets. Reactions
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to more recent events did not signal any clear cut trend.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the G-
SIB designation and describes the relevant events in our analysis. Section 3
describes the methodology and the dataset used in the subsequent analysis.
The empirical evidence is presented in Section 4, and Section 5 concludes.
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2 The G-SIB list
The focus of this study is the reaction of credit derivatives and equity markets
to specific events, namely announcements of information regarding the con-
stituents of the list of banks considered to be G-SIBs. The FSB defines these
entities as “financial institutions whose distress or disorderly failure, because
of their size, complexity and systemic interconnectedness, would cause signifi-
cant disruption to the wider financial system and economic activity”. In 2011
the BCBS agreed on specific measures targeting the G-SIBs. These measures
were meant to strengthen the resilience of the financial system and to create
incentives to reduce their systemic importance. They also set the method-
ology to assess their systemic importance and the corresponding additional
capital requirements. Starting from November 2011, the FSB applies this
methodology to identify the banks classified, on a yearly basis, as G-SIBs.
The methodology mainly consists of a quantitative analysis complemented
by a supervisory judgement backed by additional indicators and qualitative
information. The quantitative analysis computes a relative score to assess
the riskiness of each institution and the measure is a weighted average of 12
balance sheet indicators covering different risk categories. Banks with a final
score higher than 130 are designated as G-SIBs, subject to the supervisory
judgement. The complete description of the methodology can be found in
BCBS (2013). Starting from 2012, the final score is also used to allocate
the G-SIBs to different buckets corresponding to different additional capital
requirements.
Following Moenninghoff et al. (2015), we analyse two events prior to
the publication of the official list of G-SIBs by the FSB in November 2011,
which are the publication of unofficial (supposedly leaked) lists of banks that
might be classified as G-SIB by the Financial Times in November 2009 and
2010. Our paper also extends the analysis to include the publications of
the yearly updates of the G-SIB list during the years from 2012 to 2017,
implying six additional events. These updates also include the allocation
of G-SIB to different buckets, associated with different capital surcharges,
which took place for the first time in November 2012. In addition to these
events, following Bongini et al. (2015), we also consider the publication by
the BCBS on 19 July 2011 of the detailed methodology to identify G-SIB
banks. Table 1 summarizes the events considered in this analysis, following
an approach already applied in Moenninghoff et al. (2015). For all G-SIBs
designation event, the table highlights which banks are classified as G-SIBs
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and, starting from 2012, it also indicates to which bucket each G-SIBs is
assigned.
The yearly list of banks classified as G-SIBs is fairly stable over time.
That said, some banks change their status, that is they drop out or (re)enter
an updated list. Such changes occur on four occasions (note that the leaked
list is considered as reference for the first official list). Table 2 shows the
banks that either (i) entered the list, as compared to the previous one, or (ii)
that were dropped from the list.
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3 Methodology and datasets description
Our primary research question is whether inclusion of a bank in the G-SIB
list is “news” for bank debt and equity holders and whether inclusion in the
list is “good news” or “bad news”. For this analysis, we analyse the reaction
of the market in an event study setting, applying two different methodologies.
The first methodology is the standard Event Study approach (see MacKin-
lay (1997)) aimed to verify the magnitude of the market reaction compared
to the “normal” behaviour assessed trough the market model. The second
methodology applies a panel regression with event dummies, including also
covariates that control for bank characteristics and general market condi-
tions. In both approaches, we estimate the returns of the instrument (equity
and CDS) differently, given the different characteristics of the two instru-
ments. For the equity, the returns are calculated as the percentage difference
of the stock price as follows:
R EQi,t =
Pi,t − Pi,t−1
Pi,t−1
× 100 (1)
where R EQi,t is the return at time t for bank i, and Pi,t is the stock price at
the day t (closing price) for bank i. We multiply the return by 100 to have
percentages return. For the CDS, we define the return as minus the first
difference in CDS spread as to make the results for CDS spread more easily
comparable with equity returns. Thus, a positive return change is “good
news” for the CDS, since if the quoted spread reduces, the riskiness of the
reference entity reduces. The formal calculation is the following:
R CDSi,t = −(CDSi,t − CDSi,t−1) (2)
where R CDSi,t is the (minus) first difference at time t for bank i, and
CDSi,t is the CDS price at the day t (closing price) for bank i. CDS prices
are expressed conventionally in basis points.
3.1 Event study methodology
We define two relevant time intervals, or windows, to estimate the normal
returns and the abnormal returns: the estimation window and the event win-
dow. The estimation window includes a period that is before the event and
has two characteristics, namely it is not contaminated by events of the same
12
type and is reasonably long to obtain efficient estimations of the regressions’
coefficients. The event window includes the event date and a number of days
before and after, in order to estimate not only the effect of the announcement
at the day of event, but also anticipated or delayed reactions. On the one
hand, it can be that the market fully anticipates the event, thus at the day
of the event, no reaction is captured by the model. On the other hand, the
market does not anticipate the event but slowly incorporates the information
into the prices. In practice, the reaction at bank level depends from many
factors, including also the liquidity of the stock (or CDS) in the market, or
the goodness of the fit of the market model. We include different specifi-
cations of the event window, which varies from five days before the event
to five days after the event. The estimation window is fixed at 150 trading
days, and ends six days before or two days before the event, depending on
the model estimated. The timing of the announcements related to the des-
ignation of G-SIBs allows us to have non-overlapping estimation windows,
which thus ensures that the estimated beta coefficients are not contaminated
by events of the same type. The estimation of the abnormal return, or the
actual return of the bank in the event window minus the normal return over
the event window, represents the expected return regardless the event. For
each bank i and event j at time τj the abnormal return (ARi,τj) is defined
as:
ARi,τj = Ri,τj − E[Ri,τj |Xτj ] (3)
whereRi,τj represents the actual return (equity or CDS returns) and E[Ri,τj |Xτj ]
represents the normal return conditioned to the information Xτj included in
the estimation window. To calculate the expectation in the formula above,
we regress the return of the relevant market to obtain an estimation of the
sensitivity of the bank price to the market. The model reads as follow:
Ri,τj = αi + βiRm,t + i,t with E[i,t] = 0 and var(i,t) = σ2i,t (4)
where Rm,t represents the return of the market, i,t the error term with zero
mean and variance equal to σ2i,t . Hence, the abnormal returns are calculated
as:
ARi,τj = Ri,τj − (αi + βiRm,t) (5)
The choice of the most suitable market index is crucial to obtain reliable
estimations of the normal and then abnormal return. The market indices used
for the present analysis will be discussed in Section 3.4. To draw conclusions
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at the event level, we compute the following aggregated statistics. First, for
a given bank i we define the Cumulative Abnormal Return CARi(τ1j , τ2j)
for the event τj as the abnormal returns cumulated from τ1j to τ2j , that
represents the beginning and the end of the event window.
CARi(τ1j , τ2j) =
τ2j∑
τ=τ1j
ARi,τ (6)
We also define the Average Abnormal Return (AAR) and the Cumulated
Average Abnormal Return (CAAR) as the arithmetic average of the abnor-
mal returns and cumulated abnormal returns, respectively, for each event j
that occurs at time τj across banks i:
AARτj =
1
N
N∑
i=1
ARi,τ (7)
CAAR(τ1j , τ2j) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
CARi(τ1j , τ2j) (8)
In our empirical applications we test the following four hypotheses, fo-
cused on CAAR.
H0:CAAR(τ1j ,τ2j )=0 H1:CAAR(τ1j ,τ2j )6=0
H0:CAARG-SIB(τ1j ,τ2j )=CAAR
noG-SIB(τ1j ,τ2j ) H1:CAAR
G-SIB(τ1j ,τ2j )6=CAARnoG-SIB(τ1j ,τ2j )
(9)
The first test verifies whether the event has an impact on the cumulated
return of the sample banks, i.e. whether the CAAR are different from zero.
The second hypothesis test whether the group of G-SIBs banks react differ-
ently compared to the group of non-G-SIBs. For the first test we carried
out a number of parametric and non-parametric tests to verify whether the
cumulative average abnormal returns are statistically different from zero.
We apply seven tests: the standard T-test, the adjusted Patell test (Kolari
and Pynno¨nen (2010); Patell (1976)), the adjusted BMP test (Kolari and
Pynno¨nen (2010); Boehmer et al. (1991)), the Wilcoxon rank test (Wilcoxon
(1945)) and the general sign test (Cowan (1992)), the Generalized Rank T-
test and the Generalized Rank Z-test (Kolari and Pynnonen (2011)). The
second test compares the CAAR for the G-SIB and non-G-SIB groups and
14
we employ the independent 2-groups t-test, the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon
test and the Kruskal-Wallis test (Hollander et al. (2013)). These tests are
aimed to provide a statistical assessment of the different behavior of the two
groups. In other words, if the market reaction with respect to the banks
included in the list of G-SIBs is different compared to the banks excluded,
hence signaling that the status of being a G-SIB has an impact compared to
the non-G-SIB, especially for the debt holders.
3.2 Panel regression
The second methodology developed in this analysis relies on a panel regres-
sion, where we also include controls for different characteristics of the bank
itself and the general market conditions. The advantage of this methodology
is that it allows estimating the effect of the events in a single model and, in
addition, comparing the effect of the events among different groups of banks.
To assess the effect of the events, we introduce a set of dummy variables,
one for each event, that takes the value of one around the event dates and
zero otherwise. To take into account the different impact across groups of
banks, we introduce a set of interaction terms. More formally, we estimate
the following model:
Ri,t =αi + β1Rm,t + β2GSIBi,t + β3,nDt,n + β4,n(Dt,n ·GSIBi,t)
+ β5TAi,t + β6SOVi,t + i,t
where E[i,t] = 0 and var(i,t) = σ2i,t
(10)
where Ri,t represents the return (CDS first difference, or log return for equity)
for the bank i at time t, αi the specific intercept term, one of each bank, Rm,t
represents the return of the market, GSIBi,t a dummy that takes the value
of 1 when bank i at time t is designated as a G-SIB. The latter variable
maintains the value of 1 as long as the bank is included in the list, and zero
if it is excluded. The variables Dt,n represents a set of n dummy variables, one
for each relevant event. The n interaction terms Dt,n ·GSIBi,t allow to test
the null hypothesis that the average return of the non-G-SIBs differs from the
one of the G-SIBs. In case it is statistically significant, is also yields the size
and the direction of the reaction of G-SIB compared to the others. As pointed
out by Allison (1977), Shaver (2019), and Giesselmann and Schmidt-Catran
15
(2018), the interpretation of the main effect in the fixed-effect regression with
interaction terms might be bias, but the interaction term itself is not. For
that reason, we mainly discuss our results considering only the interaction
terms in the panel regressions.
As control variables, we include TAi,t that corresponds to the (yearly) log
of total asset of each bank to control for the size, and SOVi,t is the returns of
the correspondent sovereign CDS, which is country-specific. Finally, i,t is the
error term with zero mean and variance equal to σ2i,t . In our specification,
the market index is the same for all banks, thus the model can be estimated
using Ordinary Least Square (OLS). We pool all events and banks in a panel
dataset, and we restrict our analysis on a 160 window before the event, adding
at the end of the window three days, one before the event, one at the day of
the event, and one after the event. With this framework, we can capture the
average abnormal returns in the surrounding of the events, also controlling
for the country riskiness related to each bank. In each specification, we use
fixed effects by bank, and robust standard errors clustered at bank level.
The baseline estimation includes all the banks in our sample; however,
we run the same analysis also in a subset of banks, based on the value of the
GSIBs score estimated using BCBS data and the inclusion/exclusion of the
banks in the final list (see Appendix C for a description of the subset). The
regression model is:
Ri,t =αi + β1Rm,t + β2IEi,t + β3,nDt,n + β4,n(Dt,n ·GSIBi,t)
+ β5TAi,t + β6SOVi,t + i,t
where E[i,t] = 0 and var(i,t) = σ2i,t
(11)
where the additional dummies IEi,t indicates whether a bank is included or
excluded from the FSB list. The choice of the subsample and the related
analysis will be presented in Section 4.3.
3.3 Data
Data on CDS spreads2 come from the Intercontinental Exchange (ICE) of
CMA Datavision, which provides quotes for 650 distinct reference entities,
2In this paper we use interchangeably the terms “CDS quotes”, “CDS prices” and
“CDS spreads”, albeit we only observe bid and ask quotes of CDS. For our analysis, we
used the mid quotes.
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including financial and non-financial companies. Such database includes
information on restructuring clauses (XR = No Restructuring CR = Old
/Full Restructuring MR = Modified Restructuring MM = Modified Modi-
fied Restructuring, both for the 2003 and 2014 definitions), seniority (senior
or subordinated debt), with and without upfront, and with different levels of
coupon, usually related to the riskiness of the reference entity and the actual
level of CDS spread.3 The present analysis focuses on single-name CDS on
senior and subordinated debt of 131 European banks. All contracts consid-
ered are in EUR, for five-years maturity and contain the MM restructuring
clause, (the contents of which changed with ISDA standards in September
2014). We apply several data quality checks and cleaning procedures to the
initial raw dataset, given that during our sample period, banks changed their
names, merged or were acquired by other entities. Moreover, data were not
available for all banks for each date, with subordinated debt being available
for fewer banks than senior debt CDS quotes. The dataset on CDS quotes
consists of daily data from 1 January 2007 to end-January 2018 for senior
debt for 89 banks and for subordinated debt for 65 banks.
Equity prices are closing prices obtained from Bloomberg. Data are avail-
able only for listed banks and our sample includes 55 banks, 16 of which are
G-SIBs.
It is worth highlighting that three banks needed a tailor-made analy-
sis. During the sample period, Dexia CDS quoted spread over-react in the
sample period due to the sale of Dexia Bank Belgium to the Belgian State,
and the subsequent orderly resolution plan by the European Commission of
end 2012.4 For this reason, Dexia is not included in our final dataset. Re-
garding the CDS quotes of Natixis5 and BPCE, Banque Populaire and Caisse
d’Epargne merged on 2012 and, given that the spread is populated for BPCE
only after 2015, we merged the time series of BPCE and of Natixis and used
a unique series for both banks, renamed as Natixis (BPCE Group).
After merging the CDS and equity prices datasets, we end up with a final
3For details about the 2014 Credit Derivatives Definitions, see “ISDA
Frequently Asked Questions 2014 Credit Derivatives Definitions & Stan-
dard Reference Obligations” available at https://www.isda.org/a/ydiDE/
isda-2014-credit-definitions-faq-v12-clean.pdf.
4See the press release of Dexia available at http://www.dexia.com/EN/journalist/
press_releases/Pages/Ongoing_restructuring_of_the_Dexia_Group.aspx and the
European Commission Press Release IP/12/1447 of 28 December 2012.
5Natixis was the investment bank of both Banque Populaire and Caisse d’Epargne.
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dataset that includes 46 banks with observations for all three variables (senior
and subordinated CDS spreads and equity prices) spanning from January
2007 to January 2018. Table 3 shows selected summary statistics of the
data: average values, corresponding standard deviations in brackets and the
range of the 5th – 95th percentiles. The first column refers to the entire
sample of banks and the second one to those banks that are always included
on the list of G-SIBs (that is both on all official as well as the leaked unofficial
lists). Holders of equity and debt of G-SIBs have fared slightly better than
holders of equity and debt of other banks, on average.
Table 3: Summary statistics
Note: StDev stands for standard deviation and p0.05 and p0.95, respectively, for
the 5th and 95th percentile. Statistics for CDS are expressed in percentage points.
All sample banks
Banks always
considered G-SIBs
Number of banks 46 13
Average equity return (StDev) 0.01% (3.59%) 0.032% (3.204%)
(p0.05, p0.95) equity return (-4.62%, 4.636%) (-3.91%, 3.981%)
Average subordinated
-0.035 (104.32) 0.045 (12.5)
CDS change (StDev)
(p0.05, p0.95) Subordinated (-17.36, 16.920) (-15.17, 14.90)
CDS change
Average senior CDS
0.03 (28.59) 0.038 (6.47)
change (StDev)
(p0.05, p0.95) Senior (-11.615, 11.385) (-9.10, 9.11)
CDS change
MSCI index return (StDev) 0.031% (1.083%)
Itraxx index return (StDev) 0.04 (3.48)
It is worth highlighting that the criteria adopted to construct the sample
makes it biased towards the largest banks (it is in fact more likely that large
banks are the reference entity of CDS contracts or have their equity quoted).
This is confirmedby observing that, out of the 33 banks not always G-SIBs,
24 have been classified by EBA6 as Other Systemically Important Institutions
6see https://eba.europa.eu/risk-analysis-and-data/
other-systemically-important-institutions-o-siis-
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(O-SII) in the years 2015-2018.
3.4 Construction of market reference indices
The methodology discussed in Section 3.1 relied upon a market index to
estimate abnormal returns. This section discusses the indices used as market
references for CDS and equity.
The reference index for the equity market is the MSCI Europe, which
includes large and mid-cap companies across 15 countries in Europe.7 The
ideal market index for CDS would be the ITRAXX Europe Index, compiled
by IHS-Markit, which includes the 125 most liquid European CDS.8 This
index changes composition each six months and thus we develop a method-
ology to reconstruct a stable pseudo-ITRAXX indices for the senior and sub-
ordinated CDS. To build these indices, we select all entities (financial and
non-financial) such that (i) their CDS quotes are available in our dataset, and
(ii) they belong to the ITRAXX components for at least five 6-months rolling
windows from 2009 to 20189. We subsequently aggregate the CDS quotes by
means of an arithmetic average. These indices comprise all entities included
in the ITRAXX for which we have available CDS quotes, both financial and
non-financial. Following the criteria used to construct the ITRAXX, we re-
quire a firm to be present in the list of components for at least five 6-months
rolling windows from 2009 to 2018.
Figure 1 shows the sector composition of our indices.10 This approach
allows us constructing two indices, one based on the senior CDS (referred
to in the following as “pseudo-ITRAXX senior”) and another one based on
subordinated CDS (“pseudo-ITRAXX subordinated”).
Ideally, the pseudo-ITRAXX senior index might be a proper market index
for the senior CDS returns and the pseudo-ITRAXX subordinated for the
subordinated CDS returns. However, subordinated CDS are available mainly
for large banks and are very scarce for non-financial corporates, thus we do
7The index covers about 85% or the market capitalization of each country. See for
details https://www.msci.com/europe.
8See https://ihsmarkit.com/products/markit-itraxx.html for details on the In-
dex characteristics.
9ITRAXX components are renewed every 6 months, based on the liquidity of the un-
derlying reference entities.
10All quotes considered are in EUR, five-year maturity and with MM restructuring
clause. The coupon and the upfront are selected according to data availability.
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Figure 1: Sector composition of pseudo-ITRAXX indices
not deem to use the subordinated index as an appropriate market index, since
using it could bias the estimation of the abnormal returns. Therefore, we use
the pseudo-ITRAXX senior index as a market index also for the subordinated
CDS abnormal returns.
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the two pseudo-ITRAXX indices and the
MSCI Europe. To facilitate the comparison of results for the equity market
with those for the debt markets, we multiply the CDS indices by −1. It
implies that an increase in the (multiplied by minus one) CDS indices and
the equity index can be both interpreted as “good news” for debt and equity
holders, respectively. The figure shows that the historical development of
the pseudo-ITRAXX senior (multiplied by minus one) and the MSCI Europe
are broadly similar, while the pseudo-ITRAXX subordinated debt index ex-
hibits more volatility. The pseudo-ITRAXX subordinated index is mainly
composed by G-SIB banks, which reflects the observation that most subordi-
nated CDS contracts in our sample are written on financial institutions and
in particular banks. For that reason, we will consider the pseudo-ITRAXX
20
senior index as market reference in the subsequent empirical analysis for both
senior and subordinated individual CDS spreads.
Figure 2: CDS and Equity Indices
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4 Results
4.1 Event-study analysis
We begin to discuss our results starting from the standard Event Study
methodology, where for each bank and each event, we compute the abnormal
return (AR) and we aggregate them across events and groups of banks. More
specifically, we selected as a baseline the event window size equal to (−1; +1),
which includes three days and centred on the event day. We compute the
cumulated impact of each event (CAAR) independently and we distinguish
between banks classified as G-SIBs in that given event and the “other” banks.
Table 4 presents results on the CAAR.11 We provide an overall statistical
assessment for the goodness of fit for the market model in Appendix A. Using
the cumulated return (CAR) rather than the average across the window size,
we take into account that the market reaction to the publication of the list
can be anticipated or delayed.
Each column presents results for a single event and separate results are
reported for the three types of bank samples considered in the exercise (eq-
uity, subordinated and senior debt). In the discussion of the results, we focus
on the difference in terms of market reaction between the banks that have
G-SIB status at a specific point in time, and “Other” banks (grey rows in the
tables and tests below). Rows labelled “Difference G-SIBs - other” report
the difference of the CAAR computed for all G-SIBs and the CAAR of the
“other” banks. If being a G-SIBs is beneficial, we expect that the market
reaction of the G-SIB banks is more positive or less negative than for non-
G-SIBs. To distinguish between these two cases, we include in the tables the
CAAR for both G-SIBs and non-G-SIBs.
11Results and statistics for the AAR are provided in Table 10 of Appendix B.
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The differences in CAAR (Table 4) diverge substantially across bank sam-
ples. For equity we do not find significant differences, while for subordinated
and senior CDS spreads, we observe significant differences for some events.
This could indicate that CDS markets entail more information compared
to equity markets, or that the credit default swap market is more sensitive
to such events compared to the equity. This observation does not confirm
the findings of Moenninghoff et al. (2015) as they found that equity reacted
significantly different for the G-SIB and non-G-SIB banks in the first three
events. It should however be stressed that our sample only comprises Euro-
pean G-SIBs, while their results are mainly driven by non-European G-SIBs.
Looking at the CDS, we find a significant positive difference for senior and
subordinated debt for the two leaked lists. It should be, however, noticed that
for the second leaked list, we only find that one difference test is significant
for subordinated debt. It is also interesting to see that for the first event the
CAAR of G-SIBs is positive, while for “Other” banks it is negative. For the
second leaked list this is not the case. Both the CAAR are negative, but the
CAAR of “Other” banks are much more negative. It seems thus that CDS
markets incorporated the information of the leaked lists and believed that
being a G-SIB is beneficial at the time of the publication by the Financial
Times.
The publication of the G-SIB methodology does not seem to have a dif-
ferent impact on G-SIBs or non-G-SIBs. Only the t-test on the difference
for subordinated debt is significant. For the other events we do not find that
they are consistently (same sign) significantly different for senior and sub-
ordinated debt. This supports the argument of Moenninghoff et al. (2015)
that the publication of the G-SIB list becomes less and less informative over
time. It is clear that certain big banks like HSBC or Deutsche Bank will
be in the G-SIB list and thus the information content is limited for these
banks. For banks that could drop out or enter in the list there should be
more information content (see Section 4.3).
For robustness purposes, Table 11 show the same results for a different
window size, namely (−5; +5 window). Figures let us conclude that our main
findings are robust with respect to the size of the windows.
The above discussion of results mainly focused on the different reactions
between the G-SIB and other banks. To complete the analysis, we also
tested whether the selected events have a significant impact, i.e. CAAR are
different from zero. In Table 4, we included the values of CAAR and the
significance of the standard t-test, but we also implemented the parametric
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and non-parametric tests discussed in Section 3.1. The results of these tests
are presented in Table 12 and Table 13 of Appendix B. We find that in most
cases the T-test is consistent with the two non-parametric tests (Gsign and
Wilcoxon), while in other cases the Patell and BMP test cannot reject the
null hypothesis of an CAAR equal to zero. In general, the reaction of G-SIB
banks displays stronger significance for the subordinated CDS market, where
all but one event (the publication of the methodology) have at least one test
significant. The strongest events in terms of significance across bank samples
are the re-publication of the leaked list by the Financial Times, and the 2017
list. The same conclusions apply to the non G-SIBs. As pointed out before,
the results are not always consistent between the equity and the CDS. For
the latter, the most common reaction is a negative coefficient, meaning that
during the time of the event, the spread increase significantly, implying an
increase of the riskiness of the bank (insure against the default of the bank
become more expensive). Besides the value perceived by the shareholders
and reflected in the equity price, debt holders appear to be more sensitive to
the designation events.
4.2 Panel regression analysis
The present section aims to provide additional empirical evidence of the
market reactions to the events related to the designation of a bank as a G-
SIB. Following the model discussed in Section 3.2, we run a set of different
panel regressions, introducing the interaction terms between the G-SIB status
and the dummy that identifies the single events, including one day before and
one day after the release (three days in total). The results are presented in
Table 5 and are divided into three blocks. Each column refers to a different
market (equity, senior and subordinated CDS). The first block displays the
main effects of the events on the non-GSIB banks. The second block includes
the dummy variable that identifies the G-SIB status and the interaction
terms for each event. The third block contains the coefficients of the control
variables, namely the market return (MSCI for the Equity, ITRAXX for the
CDS) to control for the market conditions; the log of total asset for each
bank (end of the year) to control for the bank size; and finally, the country-
specific sovereign CDS for each bank, that allows to control for the additional
riskiness of the bank that comes from the home countries.
Considering the three markets, the reaction of the sample of banks is in
general negative. In addition, most of the cases do not have a statistically
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different reaction between the two groups of banks, with some notable ex-
ceptions. The first exception regards the publication of the methodology in
2011, where the equity market of non-G-SIB banks do not statistically react
(the overall reaction coefficient is the sum of the main effect reported in the
first block and the constant reported in the third block). Compared to the
other group, G-SIB banks react in a negative way (the overall reaction co-
efficient is given by the sum of the main effect shown in the first block, the
interaction term reported in the second block and the constant reported in
the third block): in fact, the coefficient for the interaction term is negative
and significant. A similar result is also confirmed by the senior CDS. G-SIBs
and non-G-SIBs show a negative reaction, but with a lower magnitude for
the G-SIB, as the coefficient of the interaction term is positive, but smaller
compared to the dummy for the event. The same situation, but with opposite
signs, occurs for the publication of the list in 2013, where the reaction of the
equity market is positive, though less pronounced, for the G-SIB banks. A
similar positive reaction occurs in the list of 2014 for the senior and subordi-
nated CDS of non G-SIBs, as opposed to the Equity, which is reacting with
opposite sign. The negative reaction is however consistent with the coeffi-
cient for the G-SIB (negative and significant), and it can be explained with
regard to the weight that the banking system is having on the Equity index,
which is higher compared to the CDS index. To complete the description
of results, Table 6 summarizes, for all events considered in the analysis, the
predictive margin estimated for G-SIBs and other banks (non G-SIBs).
Given the different methodology and the additional control variables that
we add for the regression, a direct comparison with the Event Study method-
ology is not possible. Nevertheless, most of the results from the previous
analysis have the same sign and a similar magnitude. The three control
variables are all significant and with the expected sign: the market index
and the sovereign CDS return have a positive coefficient. The total asset,
which controls for bank size, have a negative coefficient, indicating that big-
ger banks react less than smaller banks. In addition, we use also the fixed
effect estimation to control for banks heterogeneity. More generally, for the
first three events and for the CDS market, G-SIB appears to have a differ-
ent reaction: their quoted CDS react less than the other banks, signalling a
potential different treatment from the market participants. A bank that is
included in the list has to meet stricter requirements in terms of capital and
regulatory scrutiny. The CDS market might recognize the status of G-SIB
as an additional insurance, and charging a risk premium on banks that do
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not have the status. In this view, the new regulation has positive externali-
ties for the debt market, enhancing the resilience of the systemic banks and
reducing the potential pitfalls in case of a severe crisis. The last event in our
sample (the publication of the 2017 list) appears to have a positive effect for
all banks, in the aftermath of a revised framework to calculate the G-SIB
score from the BIS.12
One potential explanation relies on the fact that there has been an im-
provement for some banks, that moves to a lower bucket (thus implying a
reduction of additional capital buffers). In addition, according to the Basel
III Monitoring Report of September 2017, “all banks in the sample meet both
the Basel III risk-based capital minimum Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) re-
quirement of 4.5% and the target level CET1 requirement of 7.0% (plus any
surcharges for G-SIBs, as applicable)”13, testifying that systemic banks are
reducing their systemic footprint and reduce their default risk. On the other
side, this additional capital effort might be viewed by the equity market as a
potential weakness for the overall profitability. This might explain why the
equity market overall reacts negatively to the event.
4.3 Abstracting from “the obvious” to obtain more
precise estimates
Table 2 presented in Section 2 suggests that the list does not vary a lot in
terms of constituents from one year to another. In fact, in the case of many
banks in the sample, it appears obvious that they are either part of that list
or not. In those “obvious” cases, updates of the list contain limited “news”.
Examples are banks that are so large that they would be expected to always
figure on the list (e.g. HSBC, Deutsche Bank, BNP Paribas) and banks
that have such a limited global systemic footprint that they would never be
considered G-SIBs. More interesting are the cases between these two groups,
that is banks that might or might not be considered G-SIBs. To focus on
these cases, we use the scores on bank systemic importance estimated using
data published by the BCBS and select a sub-sample of altogether eleven
12See the BIS proposal on the “Consultative document Global systemically important
banks - revised assessment framework” of March 2017 and the subsequent new methodol-
ogy.
13See the “Basel III Monitoring Report September 2017” Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision available at https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d416.pdf
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banks with scores around the cut-off threshold of 130.14
Table 7 provides estimates of panel regression models for this sub-sample,
identifying when banks have changed status compared to the previous date.
We estimate the difference in results for banks that are “switching in” and
“switching out” of the list, with the baseline being banks that remain un-
changed. The complete list of banks included and excluded has been pre-
sented in Section 2. We focus in particular on the results related to the
interaction terms, which allow us to assess whether there are differences be-
tween the switching banks and the other banks.
We first focus on cases where banks have been newly included in the
list. We do find that only for the first event (“Switch IN # Initial list of
G-SIBs by FSB (Nov 2011)” in Table 7) there is a significant reaction for
the senior CDS. Compared to the banks that do not change status, the sign
of the coefficient for senior CDS is the opposite but with comparable order
of magnitude. Thus, in this case, the estimation suggests that there is value
for the banks newly included in the G-SIB, and the (senior) credit market
recognizes a positive premium (reduction in the spread) for those banks. The
equity market and the subordinated CDS market do not react to this event
in our framework. For the second event (“Switch IN # Update of G-SIBs
list (2012)” in Table 7), that is the publication of the 2012 list, there are no
significant different reactions for the banks that have been included and the
other banks. However, the coefficients of the event dummies are significant
and positive for both senior and subordinated CDS (“Update of G-SIBs list
(2012)” in Table 7). The order of magnitude of the reaction is slightly higher
for the non-switching banks.
Next, we discuss the results in instances where banks have been excluded
from the list, which occurred altogether four times (considering that the
composition of the leaked list is the reference for the first official list). In
the case of the publication of the first official list, results for equity and
credit markets differ. Exclusion is bad news for equity holders but not for
creditors, as the interaction term for equity is negative and significant for
dropped banks only. There is no difference between the two groups for senior
debt; subordinated debt of dropped banks reacts positively, while that of the
remaining banks react negatively. On the occasion of the 2012 update of the
list, the equity market does not react to exclusions; by contrast, subordinated
debt market reacts very positively. One potential explanation of the reaction
14The construction of the sub-sample is explained in more details in Appendix C.
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in subordinated debt markets is that the commitment of the no-longer G-
SIB banks to change their business models and reduce the riskiness of the
activity was credible. For instance, just a week after the publication of the
2012 G-SIBs list, Commerzbank issued a press release stressing a change in
their business model, reducing costs and emphasizing that the core capital
will exceed regulatory thresholds.15
That being said, the interpretation of the results for excluded banks on
the occasion of the 2015 and 2017 updates is different. In both these cases,
exclusion of banks meets with negative reactions in both markets for senior
and subordinated debt (“Switch OUT # Update of G-SIBs list (2015)” and
“Switch OUT # Update of G-SIBs list (2017)” in Table 7). Looking at the
predictive marginal effects, Table 8 shows that for the 2017 event the overall
effect is negative for the banks that switch out, and positive for the others.
This observation is consistent with the interpretation that there is a value
for bank creditors in seeing “their” bank as part of the G-SIB list, while
exclusion from the list might increase the perceived riskiness of the debt of
banks.
Comparing our results with the existing literature, we do not arrive at the
conclusion of Bongini et al. (2015) and Moenninghoff et al. (2015), i.e. there
was little additional information in the updates of the G-SIBs list. If we limit
our sample to the banks that might or might not be designated as a G-SIBs,
we find significant market reactions for banks that are included and excluded
from the list. Especially exclusion from the G-SIBs list seems to have a
negative impact on both the CDS and equity prices of the impacted banks.
Hence, we need to conclude that there is still some information content in
the yearly publication of the G-SIBs list.
15See https://www.commerzbank.com/en/hauptnavigation/aktionaere/service/
archive/ir-nachrichten_1/2012_7/ir_nachrichten_detail_12_29837.html. While
the press release was only published following the period under investigation, it might be
reflective of an ongoing effort of Commerzbank to stress its efforts to change towards a
less risky business model. The exclusion of the bank from the G-SIB list might perhaps
be seen as a form of official endorsement of the credibility of the announced trend change
in bank business model towards one with enhanced credit strength and more limited risk.
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Table 5: Panel regression with the full sample of banks
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Equity Senior CDS Subordinated CDS
Events
First Leaked List (2009) -0.625*** -1.192*** -1.964***
-0.215 -0.393 -0.658
Second Leaked List (2010) -0.542* -6.772** -18.854**
-0.272 -2.672 -7.788
Publication of the G-SIB methodology (Jul 2011) 0.549 -11.035*** -9.492
-0.353 -3.497 -5.661
Publication of initial list of G-SIBs by FSB (Nov 2011) -0.854** -1.683 -3.757
-0.366 -1.592 -2.867
Update of G-SIBs list (2012) -0.055 3.090*** 7.073**
-0.217 -1.044 -2.66
Update of G-SIBs list (2013) 0.597*** 0.071 0.751
-0.151 -0.287 -0.649
Update of G-SIBs list (2014) -0.888*** 1.669* 2.730*
-0.2 -0.858 -1.606
Update of G-SIBs list (2015) 0.006 -0.652 -1.027
-0.148 -0.443 -1.185
Update of G-SIBs list (2016) -0.447** -0.17 -1.856
-0.198 -0.451 -3.066
Update of G-SIBs list (2017) -0.434** 0.305* 0.849**
-0.18 -0.174 -0.382
Interaction Terms
GSIBS -0.089 -0.193** -0.251
-0.054 -0.081 -0.304
GSIBS # First Leaked List (2009) 0.538 1.121** 1.663**
-0.327 -0.467 -0.702
GSIBS # Second Leaked List (2010) -0.23 5.494** 14.913*
-0.333 -2.696 -7.981
GSIBS # G-SIB methodology (Jul 2011) -1.194*** 8.361** 6.286
-0.42 -3.458 -5.219
GSIBS # Initial list of G-SIBs by FSB (Nov 2011) 0.637 1.529 4.919
-0.532 -1.793 -3.083
GSIBS # Update of G-SIBs list (2012) 0.095 -1.968* -2.799
-0.247 -1.037 -2.568
GSIBS # Update of G-SIBs list (2013) -0.431** -0.419 -0.761
-0.198 -0.385 -0.845
GSIBS # Update of G-SIBs list (2014) 0.312 -1.618* -1.916
-0.262 -0.889 -1.669
GSIBS # Update of G-SIBs list (2015) -0.44 -0.16 0.428
-0.274 -0.438 -1.155
GSIBS # Update of G-SIBs list (2016) 0.561** 0.427 2.998
-0.226 -0.48 -3.06
GSIBS # Update of G-SIBs list (2017) 0.087 -0.058 -0.466
-0.222 -0.201 -0.607
Control Variables
Market Return 1.285*** 0.689*** 0.864***
-0.045 -0.054 -0.164
Log Bank Total Asset -0.205** -0.478* -3.681*
-0.094 -0.266 -2.188
Sovereign CDS Return (Country-Specific) 0.047*** 0.433*** 0.851***
-0.007 -0.056 -0.295
Constant 2.602** 6.198* 46.966*
-1.2 -3.379 -27.873
Observations 63,594 62,229 60,987
Adjusted R2 0.24 0.123 0.00335
Bank Fixed Effect Y Y Y
N. Banks 47 47 47
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6: Predictive margins of the panel regression with the full set of banks
Events Equity Senior CDS Subordinated CDS
GSIBS OTH GSIBS OTH GSIBS OTH
First Leaked List (2009) -0.158 -0.605 -0.170 -1.121 -0.593 -2.052
Second Leaked List (2010) -0.842 -0.523 -1.375 -6.690 -4.226 -18.908
Publication of the G-SIB methodology
(Jul 2011)
-0.715 0.566 -2.767 -10.944 -3.492 -9.565
Official publication of initial list of G-
SIBs by FSB (Nov 2011)
-0.287 -0.833 -0.252 -1.610 0.867 -3.841
Update of G-SIBs list (2012) -0.031 -0.036 1.021 3.153 3.972 6.966
Update of G-SIBs list (2013) 0.095 0.614 -0.447 0.140 -0.303 0.657
Update of G-SIBs list (2014) -0.646 -0.868 -0.049 1.734 0.520 2.632
Update of G-SIBs list (2015) -0.504 0.025 -0.909 -0.582 -0.891 -1.117
Update of G-SIBs list (2016) 0.042 -0.428 0.158 -0.100 0.847 -1.944
Update of G-SIBs list (2017) -0.417 -0.414 0.148 0.373 0.089 0.756
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Table 7: Panel regression with subsample of banks based on FSB score:
inclusions and exclusions
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES Equity Senior CDS Subordinated CDS
Events
Publication of initial list of G-SIBs by FSB (Nov 2011) 0.368 -2.875*** -1.542
-0.528 -0.709 -1.831
Update of G-SIBs list (2012) -0.057 1.777* 3.954**
-0.198 -0.811 -1.635
Update of G-SIBs list (2015) 0.368 -2.875*** -1.542
-0.528 -0.709 -1.831
Update of G-SIBs list (2017) -0.32 -0.812*** -0.744***
-0.403 -0.08 -0.22
Interaction Terms
Banks Switching IN -0.064*** -0.109 -0.575*
-0.019 -0.091 -0.317
Switch IN # Initial list of G-SIBs by FSB (Nov 2011) -1.479 5.630* 2.855
-1.043 -2.816 -4.415
Switch IN # Update of G-SIBs list (2012) 0.421 -0.72 -0.758
-0.414 -0.899 -1.967
Banks Switching OUT 0.042 0.223 -0.085
-0.044 -0.161 -0.206
Switch OUT # First List (2011) -1.597* 0.31 3.783
-0.757 -1.032 -2.39
Switch OUT # Update of G-SIBs list (2012) 0.652 0.684 6.373**
-0.603 -2.097 -2.134
Switch OUT # Update of G-SIBs list (2015) -0.890** -1.429*** -2.341***
-0.393 -0.245 -0.288
Switch OUT # Update of G-SIBs list (2017) -0.095 -1.171*** -3.042***
-0.168 -0.18 -0.429
Control Variables
Market Return 1.393*** 0.758*** 1.157***
-0.061 -0.11 -0.182
Log Bank Total Asset -0.217*** -0.295 -0.558**
-0.036 -0.166 -0.232
Sovereign CDS Return (Country-Specific) 0.106*** 0.577*** 0.812***
-0.013 -0.035 -0.058
Constant 2.942*** 4.072 7.673**
-0.492 -2.26 -3.149
Observations 15,493 15,720 15,733
Adjusted R2 0.484 0.551 0.415
Bank Fixed Effect Y Y Y
N. Banks 11 11 11
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 8: Predictive margins of the panel regressions with subsample of banks
Events Equity Senior CDS Subordinated CDS
IN Not Sw. IN Not Sw. IN Not Sw.
Official publication of initial list of G-
SIBs by FSB (Nov 2011)
-1.232 0.31 2.724 -2.796 1.015 -1.263
Update of G-SIBs list (2012) 0.347 -0.006 1.047 1.864 3.018 4.346
OUT Not Sw. OUT Not Sw. OUT Not Sw.
Official publication of initial list of G-
SIBs by FSB (Nov 2011)
-1.223 0.332 -2.107 -2.637 2.337 -1.364
Update of G-SIBs list (2012) 0.661 -0.027 2.698 1.796 10.285 4.000
Update of G-SIBs list (2015) -1.154 -0.304 -1.97 -0.764 -3.073 -0.663
Update of G-SIBs list (2017) -0.57 -0.512 -0.708 0.24 -1.872 1.238
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5 Conclusions
As part of the response to the recent financial crisis, ending “too big to fail”
became a declared policy goal. In this context, the BCBS and the FSB
developed a methodology to identify global systemically important banks
(G-SIBs). Subsequently, the FSB has started publishing, on a yearly basis,
an (updated) list of banks classified as G-SIBs. Banks included in these
lists are subject to higher capital charges and to more intrusive regulatory,
supervisory and failure resolution regimes than their peers. However, from
the previous research in this area, it is not clear whether the effect for a
banks’ creditors of being part of the list is positive or negative. Some argue16
that the initial inclusion in the G-SIB list of a bank was positive news for
its equity holders, which has been interpreted as a perception of an implicit
guarantee for the banks.
The goal of the present paper is to determine if the markets consider the
announcement of being classified as G-SIB as a good or bad news. To achieve
this goal, we assess the reaction of banks’ CDS quotes and of equity prices
to the annual publication of G-SIB lists from 2011 to 2017, the publication
of the draft methodology in 2011 and the unofficial lists published by the
Financial Times in 2009 and 2010. Analysis relies on data for a sample of
47 European banks and markets’ reactions are estimated via both an event
study and a panel regression approach.
Unlike some of the previous literature, our results do not suggest that
inclusion of a bank in the list of G-SIBs is unequivocally positive for its
debtholders. In fact, inclusion in that list is not always positive, nor its exclu-
sion from it. Our results suggest that the case of a strong cross-institutional
effect either way, that is always good or always bad, has weakened over time.
The effects of tighter regulatory and supervisory approaches to the G-SIB
banks have become more evident, perhaps partly offsetting the effects of the
perception of implicit guarantees that might accompany the G-SIB label. Our
analysis, focusing on a subset of banks that are close to the cut-off threshold
defined by the BCBS/ FSB methodology to identify G-SIBs banks, suggests
that the credit market attributes a positive premium to banks included in
the G-SIB list, while exclusion of a bank from the list seem to be perceived
as an indication of increased riskiness.
For some events, our analysis suggests that results for different types of
16See for instance Moenninghoff et al. (2015) or Bongini et al. (2015).
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bank samples might point in opposite directions, that is appearing to be good
news for equity holders and band news for debt holders and vice versa. We
interpret these results in view of the different interest that equity and CDS
holder have, that can lead to different reaction in the market. The G-SIB
status has a significantly higher regulatory burden, that include additional
capital, higher disclosure standards, and a more intrusive scrutiny by the
regulators. On the one hand, these additional requirements are strengthening
the banks’ balance sheets, making them safer and more resilient. On the other
hand, the additional regulatory capital and the other measures related to the
enhanced regulation might harm the profitability of the bank. We attempt
to measure this trade-off, that appears to be crucial in our banking sample.
Overall, our results suggest that markets care about the classification of a
bank as a G-SIB and it generally recognized a positive premium to them.
The aforementioned trade-off is also a regulatory dilemma. In fact, if the
financial markets are recognizing that the G-SIBs regulation is effective and
reduce the riskiness of the banks, then it might be extended to all the other
banks, regardless their systemic importance. This may justify an increase in
the supervision. However, the recent development of the banking business,
including new technologies and new competitors (i.e. Fintech companies)
are harming the banking profitability, that can be further reduced if the
regulation is too costly in terms of capital.
That said, the results of the present analysis do not allow us to determine
to what extent results are driven by changes in the perception of implicit
guarantees as a result of TBTF status or by changes in perceived riskiness
as a result of changed capital requirements and actual ratios as well as more
intrusive supervisory frameworks. Further research would be necessary to
shed light on this issue.
35
References
Afonso, G., Santos, J. A., and Traina, J. (2014). Do ’too-big-to-fail’ banks
take on more risk? Economic Policy Review, Forthcoming.
Ait-Sahalia, Y., Andritzky, J., Jobst, A., Nowak, S., and Tamirisa, N. (2012).
Market response to policy initiatives during the global financial crisis.
Journal of International Economics, 87(1):162–177.
Allison, P. D. (1977). Testing for interaction in multiple regression. American
Journal of Sociology, 83(1):144–153.
Benczur, P., Cannas, G., Cariboni, J., Di Girolamo, F., Maccaferri, S., and
Petracco Giudici, M. (2017). Evaluating the effectiveness of the new eu
bank regulatory framework: A farewell to bail-out? Journal of Financial
Stability, 33:207–223.
Boehmer, E., Masumeci, J., and Poulsen, A. B. (1991). Event-study method-
ology under conditions of event-induced variance. Journal of financial eco-
nomics, 30(2):253–272.
Bongini, P., Nieri, L., and Pelagatti, M. (2015). The importance of being sys-
temically important financial institutions. Journal of Banking & Finance,
50:562–574.
Cowan, A. R. (1992). Non-parametric event study tests. Review of Quanti-
tative Finance and Accounting, 2(4):343–358.
Fiordelisi, F., Galloppo, G., and Ricci, O. (2014). The effect of monetary
policy interventions on interbank markets, equity indices and g-sifis during
financial crisis. Journal of Financial Stability, 11:49–61.
Giesselmann, M. and Schmidt-Catran, A. (2018). Interactions in fixed effects
regression models.
Heynderickx, W., Cariboni, J., and Petracco Giudici, M. (2016). Drivers be-
hind the changes in european banks’ capital ratios: a descriptive analysis.
Technical report, JRC Working Papers in Economics and Finance.
Hollander, M., Wolfe, D. A., and Chicken, E. (2013). Non-parametric statis-
tical methods, volume 751. John Wiley & Sons.
36
Horvath, B. L. and Huizinga, H. (2015). Does the european financial stability
facility bail out sovereigns or banks? an event study. Journal of Money,
Credit and Banking, 47(1):177–206.
King, M. R. (2009). Time to buy or just buying time? the market reaction
to bank rescue packages. Technical report, BIS working paper.
Kolari, J. W. and Pynno¨nen, S. (2010). Event study testing with cross-
sectional correlation of abnormal returns. The Review of financial studies,
23(11):3996–4025.
Kolari, J. W. and Pynnonen, S. (2011). Non-parametric rank tests for event
studies. Journal of Empirical Finance, 18(5):953–971.
Kroszner, R. (2016). A review of bank funding cost differentials. Journal of
Financial Services Research, 49(2-3):151–174.
Lee, J., Naranjo, A., and Velioglu, G. (2018). When do cds spreads lead?
rating events, private entities, and firm-specific information flows. Journal
of Financial Economics, 130(3):556–578.
MacKinlay, A. C. (1997). Event studies in economics and finance. Journal
of economic literature, 35(1):13–39.
Mink, M. and De Haan, J. (2013). Contagion during the greek sovereign debt
crisis. Journal of International Money and Finance, 34:102–113.
Moenninghoff, S. C., Ongena, S., and Wieandt, A. (2015). The perennial
challenge to counter too-big-to-fail in banking: Empirical evidence from
the new international regulation dealing with global systemically impor-
tant banks. Journal of Banking & Finance, 61:221–236.
Patell, J. M. (1976). Corporate forecasts of earnings per share and stock price
behavior: Empirical test. Journal of accounting research, pages 246–276.
Scha¨fer, A., Schnabel, I., and Weder, B. (2016a). Bail-in expectations for eu-
ropean banks: Actions speak louder than words. Technical report, CEPR
Discussion Paper No. DP11061.
Scha¨fer, A., Schnabel, I., and Weder di Mauro, B. (2016b). Financial sector
reform after the subprime crisis: Has anything happened? Review of
Finance, 20(1):77–125.
37
Schich, S. (2018). Implicit bank debt guarantees: Costs, benefits and risks.
Journal of Economic Surveys, 32(5):1257–1291.
Schich, S. and Toader, O. (2017). To be or not to be a g-sib: Does it matter?
Journal of Financial Management, Markets and Institutions, (2):169–192.
Shaver, J. M. (2019). Interpreting interactions in linear fixed-effect regression
models: When fixed-effect estimates are no longer within-effects. Strategy
Science, 4(1):25–40.
Violon, A., Durant, D., and Toader, O. (2017). The impact of the identifica-
tion of gsibs on their business model. Technical report, Banque de France
Working Paper.
Wilcoxon, F. (1945). Individual comparisons by ranking methods. biom bull
1: 80–83.
Zhao, L. (2018). Market-based estimates of implicit government guaran-
tees in european financial institutions. European Financial Management,
24(1):79–112.
38
Appendix A
We analyse a set of statistics to assess the goodness of fit of the market models
applied to estimate the abnormal returns (Equations 4 and 5 of Section 3.1).
We run a separate regression for each bank i in the dataset and, for each
regression, we focus our analysis on the significance of the beta coefficient
and the R-squared. In fact, a poor performance of the market model might
challenge the results of the event study. Table 9 provides an overview for
each bank about the statistical properties of the regressions. The number,
reported for each bank and for each source, refers to the average R-Squared
value across the ten estimation events. The number in parentheses refers
to the proportion of times where the beta coefficient is statistically different
from zero at the 5% level (100% means that all the coefficients are statistically
significant, thus different from zero). Banks are sorted in alphabetical order,
G-SIBs on the top, then banks that do not always belong to the G-SIBs group
(status switching banks) and finally those that have never been classified as
G-SIBs.
All estimates for G-SIBs banks have strongly significant beta coefficients,
and reasonably high average R-squared, with the exception of Nordea Bank
for the CDS, where the average R-Squared is lower. As regards other banks,
the beta coefficients display a reasonable level of significance for the senior
and subordinated CDS in most of the cases: this indicates that the CDS
spreads are closely correlated to the pseudo-ITRAXX senior index. For the
equity, the choice of MSCI Europe as “market reference” also seems to be
appropriate, since the explanatory powers and significance levels are mostly
above the usual levels.
39
Table 9: Overview of inclusion of selected sample banks in the list of G-SIBs
Notes: The number indicated, for each bank and for each source, refers to the average
R-Squared value across the ten estimation events. The number in parentheses refers to
the proportion of times where the beta coefficient is statistically different from zero at the
5% level (for example, 70% means that beta coefficients are statistically significant thus
different from zero, in 7 out of 10 events). For the G-SIBs column, Y indicates that the
banks have always been in the G-SIBs list, S stands for switch (the bank enter or exit
from the group), N indicates that the bank never appeared in the list.
Bank Name G-SIBs Senior Subord. Equity
Banco Santander S.A. Y 0.61 (100%) 0.51 (100%) 0.55 (100%)
Barclays Bank Plc Y 0.54 (100%) 0.49 (100%) 0.46 (100%)
BNP Paribas Y 0.56 (100%) 0.51 (100%) 0.59 (100%)
Credit Agricole SA Y 0.59 (100%) 0.51 (100%) 0.48 (100%)
Credit Suisse Group Y 0.59 (100%) 0.51 (100%) 0.46 (100%)
Deutsche Bank AG Y 0.56 (100%) 0.45 (100%) 0.51 (100%)
HSBC Bank PLC Y 0.45 (100%) 0.46 (100%) 0.46 (100%)
ING Bank NV Y 0.49 (100%) 0.44 (100%) 0.59 (100%)
Nordea Bank AB Y 0.1 (100%) 0.06 (100%) 0.5 (100%)
Royal Bank of Scotland PLC Y 0.52 (100%) 0.44 (100%) 0.37 (100%)
Societe Generale SA Y 0.58 (100%) 0.52 (100%) 0.54 (100%)
UBS AG Y 0.54 (100%) 0.49 (100%) 0.49 (100%)
UniCredit SpA Y 0.58 (100%) 0.45 (100%) 0.41 (100%)
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA S 0.58 (100%) 0.52 (100%) 0.53 (100%)
Commerzbank AG S 0.56 (100%) 0.49 (100%) 0.33 (100%)
Lloyds Bank Plc S 0.53 (100%) 0.49 (100%) 0.38 (100%)
Natixis (BPCE group) S 0.17 (100%) 0.17 (100%) 0.42 (100%)
Standard Chartered Bank S 0.47 (100%) 0.44 (100%) 0.37 (100%)
ABN AMRO Bank N.V. N 0.43 (20%) 0.35 (20%) 0.31 (20%)
Allied Irish Banks Plc N 0.08 (70%) 0.03 (70%) 0.07 (70%)
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA N 0.45 (90%) 0.41 (90%) 0.26 (90%)
Banca Popolare di Milano SCRL N 0.24 (90%) 0.22 (90%) 0.3 (90%)
Banco BPI S.A. N 0.11 (90%) 0.07 (90%) 0.22 (90%)
Banco Comercial Portugues SA N 0.32 (90%) 0.39 (90%) 0.2 (90%)
Banco de Sabadell SA N 0.26 (100%) 0.13 (100%) 0.31 (100%)
Banco Popolare SC N 0.5 (90%) 0.4 (90%) 0.37 (90%)
Banco Popular Espanol SA N 0.29 (90%) 0.21 (90%) 0.34 (90%)
Bankia SA N 0.19 (60%) 0.14 (60%) 0.22 (60%)
Bankinter SA N 0.25 (100%) 0.14 (100%) 0.34 (100%)
BES (2014 Novo Banco) N 0.32 (60%) 0.31 (60%) 0.23 (60%)
Caja de Ahorros del Mediterraneo N 0.14 (10%) 0.34 (10%) 0.02 (10%)
Danske Bank A/S N 0.17 (100%) 0.16 (100%) 0.4 (100%)
DnB NOR ASA N 0.14 (100%) 0.07 (100%) 0.37 (100%)
Erste Group Bank AG N 0.21 (90%) 0.1 (90%) 0.37 (90%)
Governor and Company of the Bank of Ireland N 0.1 (100%) 0.09 (100%) 0.27 (100%)
Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A. N 0.59 (100%) 0.52 (100%) 0.48 (100%)
KBC Groep NV N 0.15 (100%) 0.09 (100%) 0.45 (100%)
La Caixa (Caja Ahorros Barcelona Fundacion Caixa) N 0.22 (100%) 0.21 (100%) 0.37 (100%)
Mediobanca SpA N 0.4 (100%) 0.19 (100%) 0.39 (100%)
Old Mutual Plc N 0.17 (100%) 0.08 (100%) 0.52 (100%)
Permanent TSB Public limited Company N 0.08 (50%) 0.09 (50%) 0.09 (50%)
Raiffeisen Bank International AG N 0.14 (90%) 0.04 (90%) 0.37 (90%)
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken (SEB) N 0.15 (100%) 0.06 (100%) 0.53 (100%)
Svenska Handelsbanken N 0.15 (100%) 0.08 (100%) 0.47 (100%)
Swedbank AB N 0.12 (100%) 0.08 (100%) 0.49 (100%)
Unione di Banche Italiane ScpA N 0.2 (100%) 0.16 (100%) 0.36 (100%)
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Appendix C
As discussed in Section 2, the identification of G-SIBs by the FSB relies
on a methodology, published since 2014, with a fixed cut-off of 130 on the
score. A bank above this cut-off is usually designated as a G-SIBs, but
in some cases the supervisors might include additional banks in the list or
change the reference bucket exercising the “supervisory judgment”. The
BCBS publishes the vintages of the balance sheet data necessary to compute
the scores foreseen by the above-mentioned methodology (the so-called high
level indicators).17 They are available from 2013 and they are reported for
around 80 worldwide banks. Using these data and applying the methodology
published by the BCBS, we estimated the banks’ scores for the years 2013-
2017. They are reported in Table 14.
To better understand the dynamics of the implicit guarantee, and the sub-
sequent market reaction to the designation, we decided to analyse separately
a subsample of banks that are around the cut-off threshold. The underly-
ing idea is that the market price differently the effect of implicit guarantee
versus additional capital requirement for banks close to the cut-off. Banks
on the top of the list have a different treatment from the market since they
will be almost surely included in the list. In fact, according to Table 1, the
banks in the top positions are quite stable across time, and the market al-
ready recognises that they will be included in the G-SIBs list. We expect a
different reaction for banks that are switching or that are close to the cut-off,
given that they can be included or not in the list. To construct our sub-
sample of banks, we average out the score in the five available years, and
we consider only those banks whose average score is between ±40% of the
threshold, namely between 78 and 182. Banks in bold in Table 14 are the
final components of our sub-sample.
17See https://www.bis.org/bcbs/gsib/
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Table 14: G-SIBs estimated scores and rankings (in parentheses)
Bank Name 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
HSBC Bank PLC 476.9 (1) 439.3 (1) 416.3 (1) 410 (1) 410.5 (1)
Deutsche Bank AG 417 (2) 360 (3) 357.1 (2) 333.8 (2) 363.3 (2)
BNP Paribas 407.2 (3) 404.7 (2) 329.1 (3) 311.3 (3) 314.6 (3)
Barclays Bank Plc 384.4 (4) 349.4 (4) 308 (4) 291.3 (4) 284 (4)
Credit Suisse Group 263.8 (5) 269.5 (5) 273.8 (5) 228.3 (5) 211 (5)
Royal Bank of Scotland PLC 238.5 (6) 212.5 (6) 154.4 (10) 127.8 (13) 117.7 (15)
Societe Generale SA 225.4 (7) 210.3 (7) 209 (6) 200 (6) 203.9 (7)
Credit Agricole SA 218 (8) 186.3 (10) 167.4 (9) 160.9 (9) 179.6 (9)
UBS AG 200.9 (9) 189.2 (9) 190.2 (8) 184 (8) 189 (8)
Banco Santander, S.A. 196 (10) 208.4 (8) 201.9 (7) 192.5 (7) 208.6 (6)
UniCredit SpA 147.6 (11) 165.4 (11) 148.2 (11) 134.4 (11) 142 (11)
ING Bank NV 144.1 (12) 132.4 (14) 140.1 (12) 159.1 (10) 161.2 (10)
Natixis (BPCE group) 140.9 (13) 151.3 (12) 125.7 (14) 125.5 (14) 129.7 (13)
Standard Chartered Bank 133 (14) 141.5 (13) 133.4 (13) 132.5 (12) 131.5 (12)
Commerzbank AG 121.3 (15) 107.1 (16) 90.8 (18) 78.2 (18) 80 (18)
Nordea Bank AB 120.5 (16) 129.2 (15) 122.9 (15) 115 (15) 117.8 (14)
Lloyds Bank Plc 98.2 (17) 97.2 (17) 94.9 (17) 80 (17) 74.4 (19)
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA 92.1 (18) 89.6 (18) 102.5 (16) 99.4 (16) 92.5 (16)
Danske Bank A/S 88 (19) 72 (21) 66.2 (22) 58.7 (23) 64.3 (22)
Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A. 80.1 (20) 79.9 (20) 75 (19) 75.1 (19) 85.5 (17)
Cooperatieve Rabobank U.A. 77.3 (21) 80.4 (19) 69.5 (21) 67.2 (21) 60 (23)
DZ Bank AG 61 (22) 60.4 (23) 54.5 (23) 68.7 (20) 72.3 (20)
DnB NOR ASA 60.4 (23)
Banque Federative du Credit Mutuel 58.4 (24) 63.4 (22) 70.5 (20) 65.7 (22) 68.7 (21)
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken (SEB) 58.4 (25) 49.9 (25) 48.1 (25)
Landesbank Baden-Wuerttemberg 57.7 (26)
ABN AMRO Bank N.V. 44.9 (27) 47.9 (26) 49.7 (24) 49.1 (24) 53.6 (24)
Bayerische Landesbank 44.8 (28)
Svenska Handelsbanken 44.5 (29) 42.8 (27) 34.7 (25)
CaixaBank SA 25.8 (30) 22.9 (28) 22 (26) 18.9 (25) 22.5 (26)
Nationwide Building Society 13.2 (31)
DNB Bank ASA 51.9 (24)
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